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Abstract. In this paper we offer a preliminary study of the application
of Bayesian coresets to network security data. Network intrusion detec-
tion is a field that could take advantage of Bayesian machine learning
in modelling uncertainty and managing streaming data; however, the
large size of the data sets often hinders the use of Bayesian learning
methods based on MCMC. Limiting the amount of useful data is a cen-
tral problem in a field like network traffic analysis, where large amount
of redundant data can be generated very quickly via packet collection.
Reducing the number of samples would not only make learning more
feasible, but would also contribute to reduce the need for memory and
storage. We explore here the use of Bayesian coresets, a technique that
reduces the amount of data samples while guaranteeing the learning of
an accurate posterior distribution using Bayesian learning. We analyze
how Bayesian coresets affect the accuracy of learned models, and how
time-space requirements are traded-off, both in a static scenario and in
a streaming scenario.
Keywords: Network intrusion data · Bayesian machine learning · Bayesian
coresets · Logistic models
1 Introduction
Securing modern networks is a non-trivial challenge that requires high through-
put (to evaluate in real-time the behavior of the network) and expert knowledge
(to decide whether suspicious or malicious activity is taking place on the net-
work). Network intrusion detection, in particular, is concerned with the early
detection of attempts of breaking into and/or comprising a network. Packet
collection techniques allows the continuous monitoring of networks and the col-
lection of large amounts of traffic data.
Modern network intrusion detection data sets quickly exceeds the process-
ing capacity of human reviewers, and thus automatic processing techniques for
filtering and analyzing the data become necessary. A simple solution consists in
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eliciting knowledge from experts and encoding it into logical rules. Such rule-
matching or signature-matching algorithms can process the data quickly, but
their effectiveness is limited by the sort and the range of knowledge provided by
the experts; in particular, these algorithms lack any sort of generalization and
are unable to deal with novel data that do not perfectly match the encoded rules
(Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016). Machine learning has been put forward as a po-
tential solution to this shortcoming. By learning directly from the data, and not
from the particular knowledge provided by experts, machine learning algorithms
aim at learning patterns that may hold not only for historical collected data,
but also for future unforeseen data.
Many current machine learning techniques rely on large amount of data to
learn useful patterns. The success of deep learning, in particular, has been ex-
plained by, among other factors, the availability of big data sets (LeCun et al.,
2015). However, large data sets have also significant drawbacks. Large collections
of data are problematic to archive and to store on drives; they are challenging
to manipulate and load, requiring either a high amount of memory or frequent
swapping operations; they are often redundant, to the point that this redundancy
contributes little or nothing to the learning process.
Beyond deep learning, other machine learning algorithms may be severely
affected in a negative way by large redundant data sets. This is the case, for
instance, of Bayesian machine learning. Bayesian machine learning provides a
rigorous framework for performing inference over data. It allows the estimation
of complete probability distributions, a precise evaluation of uncertainty, the
possibility of neatly integrating prior expert knowledge in the learned model,
and the ability to update the learned model when provided with new data.
However, all these possibilities come at a high computational cost, as standard
Bayesian learning relying on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithms
do not to scale well with respect to the size of the data.
In presence of large redundant data sets, a possible solution to make infer-
ence via MCMC feasible consist in the reduction of the number of samples used
to learn. Simple solutions include statistical techniques like random sampling or
unsupervised learning algorithms such as clustering via k-means Bishop (2006).
A more exact approach is based on the idea of creating coresets: instead of learn-
ing on the whole redundant data sets, it may be possible to define a (weighted)
subset of samples which is probabilistically guaranteed to return a result close
to the one that would be obtained by processing the whole data. In Bayesian
machine learning, Campbell and Broderick (2017, 2018) recently proposed an
efficient and promising algorithm to learn Bayesian coresets in Hilbert space
(BCH) that computes a weighted subset of samples by smartly exploiting the
structure of that space.
As many other applications, network intrusion detection could take advan-
tage of Bayesian data analysis. A careful estimation of uncertainty when eval-
uating the possibility of a threat on the network is critical in order to take de-
cisions. The possibility of integrating expert knowledge and update models are
also important features in the complex and constantly changing environment of
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networks. Unfortunately though, the amount of data collected by capturing pack-
ets on a network quickly exceeds the feasibility of performing Bayesian machine
learning via MCMC. By filtering redundant data and reducing the amount of
samples via BCH, network traffic data sets could be reduced in size (thus offering
a concrete benefit for storing and management) and processed using Bayesian
techniques (thus producing more complete and versatile results).
In this paper we conduct a preliminary study of the possibility of applying
BCH to network intrusion detection data and perform Bayesian machine learning
via MCMC. We consider two main problems. (i) How effective is the use of
BCH to learn models of network intrusion? We address this question considering
(subsets of) realistic network traffic data and evaluating the effectiveness of
BCH on a simple supervised learning problem. While an evaluation of BCH on
computer security data (phishing data sets) is already provided in Campbell
and Broderick (2017, 2018) in terms of metrics of posterior quality, we offer here
an analysis in terms of accuracy, which is more relevant to the field of cyber-
security. In particular we consider our results in light of the trade-off between
time-space and accuracy and with respect to the sensitivity of BCH to its hyper-
parameters. (ii) How effective is the use of BCH to reduce the amount of data
in a streaming environment? We answer this question by considering the same
realistic network data, but setting up a more challenging scenario in which the
data samples are received sequentially. In this context, we analyze, once again in
terms of accuracy and time-space savings, the advantages that BCH may bring
when processing the data in real-time, upon arrival. Our results confirms that the
trade-off between accuracy and time-space savings when using BCH is mainly
regulated by one of the free hyper-parameters of BCH. Moreover, we show that
the algorithm could be successfully used in a streaming environment, where it
succeeds in sensibly reducing the computational time over several iterations and
in ensuring good performances by aggregating coresets over the same iterations.
On the side, while tackling these questions, we also offer a practical contri-
bution in the form of a porting of BCH algorithms1 (Campbell and Broderick,
2017) into the framework of the probabilistic programming library Edward (Tran
et al., 2016). Specifically, we adapt the original code for coreset computation to
work with Edward models, thus exploiting the probabilistic programming fea-
tures of Edward2 and the automatic differentiation feature of Tensorflow3. Code
for this implementation is available online4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes
Bayesian machine learning and BCH. Section 3 explains the problem of network
intrusion detection. Section 4 introduces our experimental setup. Section 5 tack-
les our first research question by analyzing the use of BCH on network traffic
data. Section 6 deals with our second research question by evaluating the use of
BCH in a streaming environment. Finally, Section 7 summarizes our results and
1 https://github.com/trevorcampbell/bayesian-coresets
2 http://edwardlib.org/
3 https://www.tensorflow.org/
4 https://github.com/FMZennaro/BayesianCoresets-Edward
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presents some of the several avenues available for further development of this
work.
2 Background
In this section we first introduce our general notation for the learning problem.
We review the Bayesian approach to learning and its limitations. We then explain
how Bayesian coresets deal with the problem of scalability. Finally, we review
alternative approaches to work around the computational challenges of Bayesian
learning.
2.1 Notation
In the following, we will deal with standard supervised learning problems. We
consider a data matrix X of dimension N × F , containing N samples described
by F features; a sample xi is a vector of dimension 1 × F . We also assume we
are given a label vector y of dimension N , such that for each sample xi we have
a label yi. Our aim is to learn a model mapping samples to labels: fθ : xi 7→ yi,
where θ is a set of parameters defining the mapping function f .
The standard approach of machine learning is to convert this learning prob-
lem in an optimization problem as a function of the parameters θ. The optimal
solution is found by computing the point estimate θˆ of the parameters. For each
input sample xi we can then compute the output as yi = fθˆ (xi). The result yi
(which can be interpreted probabilistically if calibrated (Shalizi, 2013)) is the
output of the single model fθˆ on which we invested all our trust.
2.2 Bayesian machine learning
In Bayesian machine learning we tackle the problem of supervised learning with
the aim of computing a full distributional estimation P (θ) of the parameters θ,
instead of a point estimation. In this way, for each input sample xi we can com-
pute a distribution over the possible outputs P (yi|xi; θ). This result represents
the probability distribution of the output, computed considering all possible
values of the parameters θ scaled by the trust assigned to them.
More formally, in Bayesian machine learning we estimate the posterior distri-
bution pi (θ) = P (θ|X) of the parameters given the data using Bayes’ formula:
P (θ|X) = P (X|θ)P (θ)
P (X)
=
P (X|θ)P (θ)∫
P (X|θ)P (θ)dθ =
L (X; θ)pi0 (θ)∫ L (X; θ)pi0 (θ) dθ ,
where pi0 (θ) = P (θ) is the prior probability distribution over the parameters,
L (X; θ) = P (X|θ) is the likelihood function of the data with respect to the
parameters, and P (X) is the evidence.
Computing the posterior distribution is a challenging task that requires the
evaluation of the product of likelihood function L (X; θ) and prior distribution
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pi0 (θ), and the evaluation of the evidence integral. Monte Carlo Markov chain
(MCMC) algorithms are a practical solution to this problem based on the idea of
sampling from the posterior distribution (Givens and Hoeting, 2012). The main
drawback of this approach is the computational scalability as the complexity of
sampling a posterior point grows linearly with the size of the data (Campbell
and Broderick, 2017).
2.3 Bayesian coresets
Evaluating the posterior distribution via MCMC sampling requires the com-
putation of the likelihood L (X; θ). Under the assumption of independent and
identically distributed data, the likelihood for the whole data set L (X; θ) may
be factorized in the product of the likelihoods of individual data points L (xi; θ):
L (X; θ) =
∏
i|xi∈X
L (xi; θ) ,
or, equivalently, in the product of log-likelihoods:
logL (X; θ) =
∑
i|xi∈X
logL (xi; θ) .
Bayesian coresets compute a small weighted subset of the original data T ⊆
X such that the log-likelihood computed on T approximates the log-likelihood
computed on X:
logL (X; θ) =
∑
i|xi∈X
logL (xi; θ) ≈
∑
n|xn∈T
wn logL (xn; θ) = logL (T;w, θ) ,
where xn are samples belonging to the coreset and wn are the associated weights.
The degree of approximation may be evaluated in terms of epsilon-distance
between the the original log-likelihood and the coreset likelihood:
|logL (X; θ)− logL (T;w, θ)| ≤  · |logL (X; θ)| ∀θ. (1)
Estimating this distance is challenging, and an approximation is offered by Hug-
gin’s algorithm (Huggins et al., 2016).
Bayesian coresets in Hilbert spaces. A refinement of this solutions has been
proposed by Campbell and Broderick (2017), with the suggestion of embedding
log-likelihoods in a Hilbert function space. This reformulation has several ad-
vantages. First, by taking the objects of this space to be functions of the form
g : Θ → R, log-likelihoods logL (xi; θ) or logL (xn;wn, θ) become vectors of
this space; consequently, the total likelihood over the whole data set logL (X; θ)
or the coreset logL (T;w, θ) can be expressed in terms of vector sum. Second,
by taking as a norm of the space a bounded sup norm ‖g‖ = supθ
∣∣∣ g(θ)logL(X;θ) ∣∣∣,
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we can restate the constrained problem in Equation 1 as a sparse quadratic
minimization problem:
min
w
‖logL (X;w)− logL (X)‖2
under the constraints:
wn ≥ 0∑
1 [wn > 0] ≤M,
where 1 [c] is the identity function that returns 1 if c holds or 0 otherwise, and
M is a maximum number of coreset samples xn that we allow selecting. This
fomalization turns the problem of constructing a coreset into an optimization
problem aimed at finding the minimal set of samples xn that approximates the
log-likelihood on the data set. Finally, the structure of the Hilbert space allows
us to exploit the directionality of the space in order to account for residual errors
between logL (X;w) and logL (X) and to better select samples xn that would
improve the approximation. Algorithms for coreset construction that exploit
the properties of the Hilbert space include the coreset construction based on
Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Campbell and Broderick, 2017) and the GIGA algorithm
(Campbell and Broderick, 2018).
Model dependency of Bayesian coresets. As it has been underlined by Coleman
et al. (2018), it is important to remark that a coreset computed by a BCH
algorithm is tightly connected to a specific family of models. Such a coreset does
not constitute a generic weighted non-redundant distillation of the original data
set; it is a subset of the original data optimized with respect to a specific family
of models in order to produce a posterior distribution as close as possible to the
one that we would learn from the original data set. In sum, a BCH is actually a
tuple made up by a family of models and a weighted set of samples.
2.4 Alternative approaches to BCH for Bayesian learning
BCH is just one of the possible approaches to make Bayesian machine learning
feasible on large data sets. Other approaches which do not involve reducing the
number of samples include variational Bayes, parallel MCMC and approximate
MCMC. Variational Bayes algorithms forgo the idea of using MCMC algorithms
to perform inference, and rely instead on variational approximations of the pos-
terior (Bishop, 2006). The variational approach allows learning in presence of
large data sets, but the method does not provide guarantees on the degree
of approximation of the uncertainty of the posterior (Giordano et al., 2015).
Parallel MCMC algorithms rely on parallelization: large data sets are divided
among multiple clusters; each cluster runs locally Bayesian inference via MCMC
and produces a posterior distribution; finally, all the posteriors are aggregated
by finding a unique posterior in the metric space of the posterior distributions
(Neiswanger et al., 2013; Srivastava et al., 2015). The parallel approach allows to
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deal with large data sets, but it still requires a high computational budget and
does not address the problem of storing redundant data. Finally, approximate
MCMC aims at speeding up existing algorithms by replacing costly transition in
the Markov chain process with approximations (Johndrow et al., 2015). Again,
this approach is effective when we have to process large data sets, but it re-
quires analyzing the execution of the MC algorithm, and, once again, it does not
consider the problem of storing redundant data.
3 Network Security
Network security is one of the main challenges in the management of online
systems. Network administrators try to monitor and prevent malicious activity
through the deployment of intrusion detection systems, the collection of network
traffic, and the analysis of this data (Northcutt and Novak, 2002). Processing
these data in a timely manner in order to detect suspicious activity as early
as possible is a crucial problem. The ease with which large amount of data
can be collected on a network poses severe scalability problems, both in terms
of storage and in terms of processing (Gardiner and Nagaraja, 2016). Given
this constraint, computationally-cheap algorithms, such as signature-matching,
random forests and support vector machines, have been favored; for a review of
pattern recognition and classical machine learning algorithms applied to network
security, see, for instance, Gardiner and Nagaraja (2016) and Garcia-Teodoro
et al. (2009).
4 Experimental Setup
In this section we provide a formal description of our study by defining the exact
learning problem we considered, by presenting the data sets and the transforma-
tions we applied to them, and, finally, by discussing the models we implemented.
Problem definition Given a large data set for network intrusion detection, we
express our learning problem as a supervised learning problem in which we try to
discover a function that maps network flows to an output defining whether a flow
is malicious or not. More precisely, we try to infer an optimal set of parameters
θ that define the mapping function fθ : xi 7→ yi. In a first static scenario, we
process our data with and without BCH, running the simulations multiple times
ad observing the contribution of the BCH algorithm. In a second scenario, we
simulate the progressive collection of large chunks of data. All the data samples
are taken to be independent and identically distributed. In this case, we observe
what the contribution of BCH would be if we were to filter out data as soon as
they are collected.
Network data set. To run our experiments we use the network traffic data col-
lected in the CICIDS2017 data set (Sharafaldin et al., 2018). Processing real-
world network data presents challenges from a privacy perspective; for this rea-
son, the CICIDS2017 was collected running a simulated network designed to
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behave in a realistic fashion. Five days of simulated traffic were collected; dur-
ing each day, different types of attacks and malicious behaviors were enacted.
Network packets are gathered and aggregated in network flows. In total, the
data set contains more than 2.5 million samples. Each sample is defined by a
78-dimensional vector reporting features such as packet flags and packet lengths.
Finally, a binary label has been assigned to each network flow, denoting whether
a flow is legitimate or not. We restrict our attention to the second day, Tuesday5,
which is made up by 445708 data samples, of which 13835 constitute instances
of brute force attacks.
Network data preprocessing. The CICIDS2017 data set contains a very limited
number of samples (201) with missing values for the day of Tuesday. Given their
limited number we simply assume that they are missing completely at random
(Barber, 2012) and we just drop them. Also, before each experiment we always
standardize the data to zero mean and unit variance by feature. Standardiza-
tion parameters are always computed exclusively on the training data being
processed.
Data set subsampling. For the purpose of this preliminary study, we evaluate
our algorithms only on limited subsets of the large CICIDS2017 data set. Study-
ing smaller data sets guarantees some advantages: (i) it allows us to compare
Bayesian learning on coresets with the ”ground truth” of learning on the whole
data sets, which would not be feasible if we were to consider the entire data set;
(ii) manipulating the data set allows us to simulate scenarios in which we receive
streaming data. While we plan to extend our evaluation to the full data set in
order to assess the true potential of BCH for network intrusion detection, we
were still able to get useful insights by studying its application on more modest-
sized subsets of the original data set. Thus, from the large original pool of data,
we programmatically create subsets by random sampling. In order to preserve
the imbalance between positive and negative instances in the training data, we
always select ten times as many positive samples as negative samples. The pro-
totypical training data set Xtri consists of 800 positive instances and 80 negative
instances. For a test data set, instead, we selected an even number of positive
and negative instances, thus simplifying the interpretation of the results. Our
prototypical test data set Xtei consists of 200 positive an 200 negative samples.
Sample reduction techniques. Given a training data set Xtri , in order to reduce
the amount of data samples, we apply BCH using the GIGA algorithm (Campbell
and Broderick, 2018). This algorithm has two free hyper-parameters: (i) the
number of random dimension on which to project the samples; and (ii) the
number of computational iteration M , which implicitly limits the maximum
number of coreset samples that can be selected.
5 Notice that we did not consider the data on Monday because no malicious activity
takes place on this day, thus providing us only with positive instances.
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Network models. For our simulations, we consider two models:
1. Bayesian logistic regression (BLR): a discriminative generalized-linear Bayesian
machine learning algorithm (Bishop, 2006). We define our weighted BLR
model as:
θ = N (0, 1)
yi = Bern ((σ (θxi))
wi)
where N (0, 1) is a Gaussian prior, and the likelihood L (X; θ) is the likelihood
under a Bernoulli pdf Bern (σ (θxi)) scaled by the weight wi associated to
the sample xi. If the data samples are not weighted, then wi = 1 for all xi,
and the model reduces to a standard BLR. Notice that, in general, if all the
samples xi are scaled by a constant value wi = k the inference process will
not change6.
Given a new sample xi, its probability of belonging to a class yi can be
obtained by integrating over all the models under the posterior: P (yi|xi) =∫
P (yi|xi, θ)P (θ)dθ.
2. Support Vector Machine (SVM): as a baseline and comparison, we consider
support vector machine, a linear maximum-margin discriminator (Cortes and
Vapnik, 1995). We train a SVM model to find the slope θ of a discriminating
hyper-plane between samples7.
Given a new samples xi, its class is computed as yi = sign (θxi), where
sign (z) is the sign function, sign (z) = 1 if z > 0, 0 otherwise.
5 Simulation 1: BCH Applied to Network Intrusion
Detection Data
In this simulation we analyze the use of BCH applied to network intrusion de-
tection data. We evaluate the contribution they provide both from the point of
view of the performance they achieve and the time-space they save. We compare
these results to the baseline offered by SVM and by a BLR computed over the
whole data set.
Protocol. We generate five subsets of training data Xtri and test data X
te
i , 1 ≤
i ≤ 5, using the methodology presented in Section 4.
We apply BCH to each training data setXtri . We set the free hyper-parameters
of BCH as follows: (i) we fix the number of random dimension to 500, following
the experimental evaluation in Campbell and Broderick (2017); (ii) we consider
three values for the number of computational iteration M , that is M = 1000,
following again the evaluation in Campbell and Broderick (2017), M = 500, and
6 We take advantage of this constant scaling to prevent overflowing errors in the
simulations.
7 Notice that for a fair comparison with the BLR model, we compute only the slope
of the discriminating hyperplane and not its intercept.
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an aggressively lower value of M = 100, which is expected to guarantee a higher
saving in terms of space and time.
For each subset i, we train and test an SVM model, a BLR model trained
on the whole data set Xtri , and a BLR model trained on the coreset computed
from the training data Xtri .
8 The SVM model is trained with default parame-
ters from the scikit9 library. The BLR models are trained using the Hamiltonian
Monte Carlo algorithm offered in the Edward library with the following settings:
sampling 10000 points, using a burn-in period of half of the samples, thinning
every second sample, and adjusting the step size manually to guarantee an ac-
ceptance rate around 0.8. When doing prediction, we use 1000 posterior samples.
We repeat each training and testing 10 times and we average the results.
We evaluate the results in terms of classification accuracy and wall-clock time
required for the training of the model (all the models are run on a non-dedicated
mid-range laptop machine with no GPU support).
Results. First of all, the data processing via BCH with different hyper-parameters
produced different coresets. Table 1 reports the number of data points selected,
specifying the number of samples in the minority class that have been preserved,
and the wall-clock computation time as a function of the hyper-parameter M .
Notice that the number of iterations M does not correspond to the number of
coreset samples selected; in all the cases the algorithm selects a number of sam-
ples well below this threshold. With respect to the original number of samples,
the amount of data points selected by BCH ranges from around one tenth, when
using a low M = 100, to one third, when using a high M = 1000.
Hyper-parameter Xtr1 X
tr
2 X
tr
3 X
tr
4 X
tr
5 Time(s)
M = 100 84/1 82/3 82/1 88/1 87/3 260.78 ± 2.37
M = 500 184/4 191/10 186/7 189/9 200/10 251.82 ± 3.05
M = 1000 259/5 270/15 239/4 252/8 252/6 268.63 ± 2.51
Table 1: Coresets computed on each training data set Xtri . The table reports the
number of data points selected to the left of the slash (/), and the number of
these points belonging to the minority class to the right of the slash (/). The last
column reports average and standard deviation of the wallclok time to compute
the coresets.
Figure 1 shows the accuracy of our models on the different data sets we
considered. Consistently with our expectations, the two linear models, SVM and
BLR on the whole data set, perform similarly; BLR models trained on coresets
8 Notice that we do not train the SVM model on the coresets because, as discussed
in Section 2.3, coresets are not generic non-redundant sub-data sets, but they are
sub-selections optimized for a specific statistical model.
9 https://scikit-learn.org/stable/
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show, in general, decreasing performances as we decreased the hyper-parameter
M of the BCH algorithm.
Fig. 1: Mean and standard deviation of accuracy of the models on each data set
Xtei .
Figure 2 compares the wall-clock time of each algorithm. The highly opti-
mized SVM algorithm shows some variability, but in general terminates in tenths
of seconds. On the other hand, BLR takes up to two orders of magnitude longer.
BLR on coresets is faster, even if on the same time scale; surprisingly using
coresets with M = 500 took the shortest time, which may be due to the particu-
larly good sub-selection of points, or, more likely, to other contingent processes
running on the same machine.
Discussion. These basic experiments highlight that the time-space savings of-
fered by BCH inevitably come at the cost of the accuracy of the final model.
The number of iterations M provides a key hyper-parameter to manage such a
trade-off, as it exchanges the dimension of the data set for the accuracy of the
model.
Notice that from these experiments, the time saving offered by coresets does
not appear particularly remarkable. It is worth, though, to underline that such
an improvement is relevant when related to the small data sets we are processing.
The time savings when using larger data set are discussed in detail in Campbell
and Broderick (2017).
Interestingly, the computation of coresets has a subsampling effect with re-
spect to the minority class, as shown in Table 1: while in the original data set the
ratio between the two classes was set to 1:10, this ratio has sensibly decreased.
This may seem undesirable if we were expecting BCH to produce a more bal-
anced data set; in reality, though, the algorithm selects only samples useful for
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Fig. 2: Mean and standard deviation of wall-clock time required for training the
models on each data set Xtri . Notice the different y-scale for SVM on the left
side, and the BLR model on the right side.
a proper reconstruction of the likelihood function, and the result seems to sug-
gest that the instances of malicious behaviours may actually be quite redundant,
probably due to the fact that we are considering only one specific form of attack
(brute force).
6 Simulation 2: BCH in a Streaming Environment
In this simulation we try to setup a more interesting and realistic scenario. We
simulate the collection of batches of data in real-time and we learn from the
cumulative set of collected samples. The aim is to evaluate how the learning
process would be affected if the sets of collected data were to be downsized us-
ing BCH before being processed and stored. Such a scenario seems particularly
interesting because BCH would immediately discard redundant data, thus solv-
ing at once the problem of making Bayesian inference feasible and reducing the
required amount of memory and storage space.
Protocol. As before, we generate five subsets of training data Xtri and test data
Xtei , 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Now, however, instead of processing each data set independently,
we simulate the arrival of a data set Xtri at time steps ti. At each time step ti,
we want to learn from all the collected data sets and so we pool together all the
data Xtrj , for j ≤ i. Notice that all the samples are independent and identically
distributed.
When using coresets, we apply BCH to each training data set Xtri as soon
as it is collected. At each time step ti, instead of aggregating together all the
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previously collected data, we just aggregate the coresets. This operation is the-
oretically justified by the possibility of aggregating coreset computed in parallel
(Campbell and Broderick, 2017). We use the same hyper-parameters for BCH
used in the previous simulation.
We also run the same models as before, and we repeat each simulation 10
times.
Results. We work with the same coresets computed in the previous simulation
and we refer back the reader to Table 1 for their details.
Figure 3 shows the accuracy of the models on the different data sets we gen-
erated. The starting values of accuracy computed on a single data set (X1) are
consistent with the values computed in the previous experiments and shown in
Figure 1. When we start aggregating more data sets, we notice that the per-
formance of SVM and HMC on the whole data set is only slightly improved;
on the other hand, the performance of BLR on coresets shows a consistent im-
provement. Even aggregating only two coresets (X1 +X2) the performance gap
between BLR on coresets and SVM or BLR on the whole data set is signifi-
cantly reduced. This improvement is expected when aggregating two coresets
computed with the hyper-parameter M = 500; in this case, the final amount of
selected data points would be close to the amount obtained computing a single
coreset with the hyper-parameter M = 1000; and we know from the previous
simulations that the performance of BLR trained on a coreset computed with
the hyper-parameter M = 1000 is very close to the performance of BLR on the
whole data set. More surprising is the improvement registered by aggregating
only two coresets computed with hyper-parameter M = 100.
Figure 2 compares the wall-clock time of each algorithm. Again, the time
scale of the two family of algorithms, SVM and BLR, are very different. However,
notice that while the computational time for SVM and BLR on the whole data
sets tend to grow in a linear fashion, the growth in the required computational
time when running BLR on coresets is almost flat.
Discussion. This simulation showed the potential advantages that could be ob-
tained by deploying BCH in a streaming scenario. In such an instance, the aggre-
gation of two or more coresets can provide a performance very close to SVM or
BLR trained on the whole data. One of the most significant advantages, though,
is that BCH reduces the amount of data in real-time before learning, thus lim-
iting the amount of memory necessary for processing; guaranteeing a sub-linear
growth in the time required for learning as more data are gathered may prove
especially advantageous when data is collected in real-world environments in
which batches of data are generated continuously over multiple timesteps.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
This preliminary study showed the feasibility of applying BCH to network data.
Network intrusion detection could take great advantage by employing fully prob-
abilistic descriptions of network traffic, and BCH may prove to be an enabler for
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Fig. 3: Mean and standard deviation of accuracy of the models on each data set
Xtei .
Fig. 4: Wall-clock time required for training the models on each data set Xtri .
Notice the different y-scale for SVM on the left side, and the BLR model on the
right side.
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such an approach. Moreover, we showed that the same algorithm is also effective
in reducing the number of samples to be stored; this issue is particularly relevant
when collecting network packets, as the amount of data may quickly grow and
cause severe challenges in their management.
Our experiments first confirmed the concrete trade-off between model ac-
curacy and time-space saving when adopting BCH. More interestingly, we also
investigated how BCH may be deployed in a dynamic streaming environment in
which data samples would be filtered in real-time before processing. This last
scenario returned particularly good and interesting results, showing that BCH
can be effectively used to sub-select relevant data samples at different time steps
and aggregate together only the coresets. We demonstrated that in a streaming
scenario the use of BCH may guarantee a better scalability by ensuring that the
computational time for learning grows in a strongly sub-linear fashion.
Of course this study is just a preliminary evaluation of the potential of BCH
applied to the challenging problem of processing the large data sets for network
security. Further investigation is clearly necessary to assess more precisely the
role that BCH may serve. Immediate directions of further study that we con-
sider are the following: applying our protocol to bigger and more realistic data
sets; include other typologies of attacks; compare BCH to other data reduction
techniques, such as random sampling or k-means. More interesting questions
concern also the recursive application of BCH in a streaming scenario and its
effectiveness when used to process streaming data that do not conform to the
assumption of independent and identically distributed data anymore.
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